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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Cloud computing is one of the most useful innovations in the
digital age.' While much of the attention on recent advances has focused
on smartphones, tablet computers, and wearable technology, the cloud is
2perhaps unrivaled in its utility for organizations. From simplified data
storage to innovative software platforms, enterprise-grade cloud solutions
provide cost-effective alternatives to acquiring expensive computer
hardware and software.3 Enterprise clouds also offer a collaborative work
environment for a mobile and widespread work force, enabling businesses
to maximize worker productivity.4
*Consultant, Discovery and Information Governance, Driven, Inc.; J.D., Santa Clara
University School of Law, 1999; B.A., Political Science, Brigham Young University,
1994.
1 See Joe McKendrick, 5 Benefits ofCloud Computing You Aren't Likely to See in a Sales




2 See Edwin Schouten, 5 Cloud Business Benefits, WIRED (OCT. 5, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/insights/2012/10/5-cloud-business-benefits/, archived at
https://perma.cc/7LJK-RP4M.
3 See Jim Lynch, What Are the Benefits and Drawbacks ofCloud Computing?,
TECHSOUP (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.techsoup.org/support/articles-and-how-tos/what-
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[2] Organizations are not alone in reaping the benefits of cloud
computing. Individuals have likewise discovered the value that cloud
providers offer in their personal lives.5 With increased storage for digital
photos, music, and other files, personal cloud providers help users avoid
losing personal data when a computer hard drive inevitably fails. 6
Furthermore, the transfer functionality afforded by personal clouds
enables users to seamlessly move data between computers, smartphones,
and other mobile devices.
[3] With such utility at their fingertips, it should come as no surprise
that individuals use personal clouds to facilitate work responsibilities.8
Personal cloud providers like Dropbox, Box, and Google Drive can
obviate clunky network storage options and simplify data sharing and
teamwork among colleagues. 9 While employees of many organizations
See Nicholas Lee, Is Your Corporate Data Appearing on Personal Clouds?,
CLOUDTWEAKS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://cloudtweaks.com/2015/09/is-your-corporate-data-
appearing-on-personal-clouds/, archived at https://perma.cc/HD3 C-VDDX.
6 See Zack Christenson, Benefits of Cloud Computing, AMERICAN CONSUMER INSTITUTE
(Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.theamericanconsumer.org/2013/09/benefits-of-cloud-
computing/, archived at https://perma.cc/9ATN-QEP2.
See Bill Kleyman, What Personal Cloud Means for Consumers and Enterprises, DATA
CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2013/09/10/what-personal-cloud-means-
for-consumers-and-enterprises/, archived at https://perma.cc/RK2Z-VE6L.
See Louis Columbus, How Enterprises Are Capitalizing on the Consumerization ofIT,
FORBES (Mar. 24, 2014, 06:43 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2014/03/24/how-enterprises-are-capitalizing-
on-the-consumerization-of-it/#1af595ef6160, archived at https://perma.cc/38F9-KTQ6
("79% [of surveyed enterprises] report that file sharing and collaboration tools including
Box, Egnyte, Google Apps, Microsoft Office 365, GroupLogic, ShareFile and others are
pervasively used today. 49% are with IT approval and 30% are not.").
9 See Andrew Froehlich, The Buck Stops at BYOC, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 29, 2014,
12:00 PM), http://www.networkcomputing.com/infrastructure/buck-stops-
byoc/870595087, archived at https://perma.cc/K7BV-HPPL ("Employees are
comfortable using services such as DropBox, Google Apps, and Carbonite at home.
Because of that comfort level, they naturally want to use those same tools in their
2
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could benefit from such functionality, it is particularly advantageous to
workers whose employers lag behind the technology curve.10
[4] These and other features seem to make personal clouds an ideal
tool for advancing business objectives within the corporate environment."
Appearances, however, can be deceiving. That is exactly the case with
employee use of personal cloud applications in the workplace.12 From
information retention and information security to litigation readiness and
cybersecurity, personal cloud use among employees implicates a range of
troubles for organizations. 13 Indeed, the very aspects that make personal
clouds so attractive-cheap and unlimited storage, simplified transfers, and
increased collaboration-pose serious threats to the enterprise.14
business life."); Intermarine, L.L.C. v. Spliethoff Bevrachtingskantoor, B.V., No. 15-mc-
80211-MEJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112689, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2015) ("Dropbox
provides a document storage and sharing service through which users can collectively
save, share, and edit documents stored 'in the cloud.').
10 See Froehlich, supra note 9.
11 See id. ("Lack of IT management and control will quickly put an end to BYOC, even
though it has the potential to provide real benefits.").
12 See Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, No. 4:12-CV-37; 4:15cv105, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159915, at *22-24, *29 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2015) (discussing defendants'
extensive use of Dropbox to remove vast amounts of proprietary information belonging
to plaintiff).
13 See Susan Miller, New Risk on the Block: Bring Your Own Cloud, GCN (May 23,
2013) https://gcn.com/articles/2013/05/23/new-risk-bring-your-own-cloud.aspx, archived
at https://perma.cc/T7DM-3CD6.
14 See Robert L. Mitchell, IT's New Concern: The Personal Cloud, COMPUTERWORLD
(May 20, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2497860/consumerization/it-s-new-concem--the-
personal-cloud.html, archived at https://perma.cc/XZN9-RSK8.
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[5] Nevertheless, companies in many instances have taken few, if any,
actionable steps to address the proliferation of personal cloud use among
their employees. Worse, some organizations have implemented "bring
your own cloud" (BYOC) policies that officially sanction employee use of
consumer-grade cloud applications in the workplace without sufficient
corporate oversight. 16 A BYOC policy that lacks proper measures to
ensure compliance may very well result in a disastrous outcome for the
enterprise. 17
[6] In this article, I address these issues by surveying recent court
cases that exemplify the information governance and litigation challenges
arising from personal cloud use in the business enterprise. In particular, I
discuss the problems with BYOC practices that expressly or implicitly
enable employee use of personal clouds. I also spotlight some of the
troubles that stealth use of personal clouds creates for organizations. I
conclude by suggesting some practices that can help organizations
ameliorate these problems.
II. LAISSEZ-FAIRE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL CLOUD
USE IN THE CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT
[7] Employers are often directly responsible for the difficulties that
have resulted from employee use of cloud applications.18 That employers
are at fault does not stem from this being a new trend. Indeed, personal
cloud providers have been around since the 2000s, 19 with courts
15 See discussion infra Part II.
16 See Froehlich, supra note 9.
17 See id. ("BYOC presents a nightmare scenario because data can be copied, duplicated,
and ultimately lost or stolen via the various cloud services.").
"s See Columbus, supra note 8.
19 See Victoria Barret, Dropbox: The Inside Story of Tech's Hottest Startup, FORBES (Oct.
18, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/victoriabarret/2011/10/18/dropbox-the-
inside-story-of-techs-hottest-startup/4/# 1cace6c73a44, archived at http://penna.cc/C9Q3-
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examining the troubles associated with cloud computing beginning in
2011.20 Organizations previously overlooked the risks of this trend by
authorizing their executives or employees to use personal cloud21applications in the corporate ecosystem. In addition, they ignored the
hazards associated with the stealth use of personal clouds.2 2 This Part
examines cases that address these aspects of employee use of consumer
clouds.
A. Corporate Approved BYOC Accounts
[8] In many instances, organizations have openly welcomed the use of
personal clouds by their employees.2 3 Whether by policy or by practice,
corporate IT departments have approved personal cloud use by expressly
enabling its functionality. 24 Nevertheless, that is often the extent of
corporate oversight.2 5 Beyond requiring an employee to sign a perfunctory
465F; Jonathan Strickland, How Cloud Storage Works, HowSTUFFWORKS.COM (Apr. 30,
2008), http://computer.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloud-storage2.htm,
archived at https://perma.cc/5JTG-UZS3 (Web-based e-mail providers like Yahoo! and
Hotmail have been providing their users with a quasi-cloud computing environment
through e-mail since the 1990s).
20 See, e.g., Animators at Law, Inc. v. Capital Legal Solutions, L.L.C., 786 F. Supp. 2d
1114, 1117-18 (E.D. Va. 2011) (explaining that plaintiff's former employees accessed
company files stored in a company Dropbox account through login credentials that
plaintiff failed to disable after the employees left the company).
21 See Columbus, supra note 8.
22 See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Lee, No. 13-13156-DJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66220,
at *2, *4-7 (D. Mass. May 14, 2014) (enjoining defendant from using proprietary
information that he had taken from his prior employer and which he stored both during
and after his employment on Google Drive).
23 See Selectica, Inc. v. Novatus, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1708-Orl-40TBS, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30460, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2015).
24 See Columbus, supra note 8.
25 See Froehlich, supra note 9.
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non-disclosure agreement, little follow up effort is taken to prevent
employees from transferring confidential information from company
servers to a personal cloud.2 6
[9] Such corporate inaction can be challenging for cybersecurity
initiatives, retention schedules, and preservation requirements in litigation.
However, it can be especially problematic when an employee leaves the
company with proprietary materials and begins working for an industry
competitor. 27 The Selectica v. Novatus 28 and PrimePay v. BarneS 29
decisions are particularly instructive on the need for organizations to
abandon their laissez-faire attitude toward employee use of approved
BYOC accounts.
1. Selectica v. Novatus
[10] In Selectica, plaintiff (Selectica) filed suit against defendant
30(Novatus), claiming Novatus misappropriated various trade secrets. In
particular, Selectica alleged that four of its former sales personnel violated
their respective non-disclosure agreements by sharing confidential pricing
26 See Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, No. 4:12-CV-37; 4:15cv105, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159915, at *7-9 (observing that defendants' former employer began investigating
the possibility that defendants took proprietary company data in violation of their non-
disclosure agreements only after one of the defendants mentioned that "she knew where
too many bodies were buried.").
27 See Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg. v. Land, No. 1:14-cv-1049-JMS-TAB, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99070, at *5-6, *9 (S.D. Ind. July 21, 2014) (explaining that defendant uploaded
confidential information from his former employer to his Google Drive account before
going to work for an industry competitor).
28 See Selectica, Inc. v. Novatus, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1708-Orl-40TBS, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30460 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2015).
29 See PrimePay, L.L.C. v. Barnes, No. 14-11838, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65710 (E.D.
Mich. May 20, 2015).
30 See Selectica, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30460, at *4.
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information with Novatus, their new employer. 31 Those agreements
provided that the employees would maintain the confidentiality of
Selectica's proprietary information and return all such materials to the
32company upon termination of their employment.
[11] Despite those agreements, one of the employees (Holt) offered to
share Selectica's pricing information to a member of Novatus' senior
management team after joining Novatus.3 3 Holt still had access to that
information along with other data belonging to Selectica because he
maintained it with Box, a cloud storage provider.3 4 The Box account was
not a stealth cloud drive concealed from Selectica.3 5
[12] Instead, Selectica expressly recommended and authorized Holt to
store that data under a BYOC arrangement with Box: "While employed by
Selectica, [Holt] had a company laptop computer which, on Selectica's
recommendation, was configured so that it automatically synced to his
personal cloud storage account at Box.com. This meant that when Holt
saved a file to the laptop, the system pushed a copy to his Box account."36
Despite having enabled the BYOC arrangement with Holt, Selectica
apparently neglected to disable the Box account or remove any proprietary
materials upon Holt's departure.37 As a result, Holt had full access to the
pricing information when he joined Novatus.3 8
31 See id. at *2.
32 See id. at *1.
33 See id. at *3.
34 See id.
35 See Selectica, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30460, at *2-3.
36 Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
37 See id. at *2.
38 See id. at *2-3.
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[13] Selectica demonstrates the folly of a lax approach to personal
cloud use within the enterprise. While Selectica enabled the Box account
for backup purposes, it took no action to protect Selectica's interest in the
corporate information stored in that account. For example, Selectica did
not obtain Holt's login credentials to the Box account. 3 9 Nor does it appear
that Selectica monitored Holt's use of the account while employed with
the company.4 0 Selectica did not disable the Box account when Holt left
the company.4 1 Furthermore, Selectica took no action to confirm that Holt
had either returned or destroyed all proprietary company information
42before going to work for Novatus.
[14] Any one of these steps-and certainly a combination of them-
would likely have prevented the disclosure of Selectica's product pricing
information to an industry competitor.4 3 Selectica exemplifies the need for
corporate oversight of approved BYOC accounts if organizations are to
prevent their trade secrets from falling into the hands of competitors.
2. PrimePay v. Barnes
[15] Another exemplary decision on these issues is PrimePay v.
Barnes. Like Selectica, PrimePay involves claims of trade secret
misappropriation.4 5 In PrimePay, the plaintiff (PrimePay) sued one of its
39 See id. at *17.
40 See Selectica, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist LEXIS 30460, at *2-3.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See Tom Nolle, Bring Your Own Cloud: The Movement Companies Can't and
Shouldn 't Stop, TECHTARGET (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://searchcloudapplications.techtarget.com/feature/Bring-your-own-cloud-The-
movement-companies-cant-and-shouldnt-stop, archived at https://perma.cc/C478-7NCG.
See PrimePay, L.L.C. v. Barnes, No. 14-11838, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65710 (E.D.
Mich. May 20, 2015).
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former executives (Barnes) that established a competing business entity.46
PrimePay moved for a preliminary injunction against the operation of
Barnes' business, arguing that Barnes took several categories of
confidential PrimePay information and stored it with cloud service
provider Dropbox, along with other locations.4 7 According to PrimePay,
Barnes accessed the Dropbox-stored data to allegedly help start his
competing company. He then allegedly destroyed those materials after the
plaintiff warned him "to preserve any PrimePay electronically stored
information that he possessed."4 8
[16] In response to these arguments, Barnes asserted that he never
absconded with PrimePay's proprietary data.49 Instead, Barnes explained
that any PrimePay data in his Dropbox account was from work that he
previously performed while at PrimePay.5 0 According to Barnes, that data
was mostly deleted at the time he left the company.5 1 As for the origin of
the Dropbox account, it was created far in advance of Barnes' departure
from the company. 5 2 Its purpose was not to steal proprietary data, Barnes
argued, but to allow him to complete work for PrimePay when he was
away from the office.53 Nor was this a stealth account; it was a company-
approved BYOC:
1 See id. at *2.
46 See id. at *4-5.
17 See id. at *2, *9-11.
" Id. at *8-9.
49 See PrimePay, L.L.C., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65710, at *3.
5o See id. at *11-13.
51 See id. at *12.
52 See id. at *11.
53 See id.
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Barnes created the Dropbox [account] . . . so that he could
transfer and access files when he worked remotely on
PrimePay matters if he was away from the office, on
vacation or elsewhere and needed access to the PrimePay
files, all with the knowledge and approval of [PrimePay
owner] Chris Tobin.5 4
[17] Given that Barnes' Dropbox account was a company-approved
BYOC account, and in light of other evidence suggesting Barnes did not
access the Dropbox files or other proprietary PrimePay information after
leaving his position with the company, the court did not find evidence of
trade secret misappropriation. While the court ordered the destruction of
PrimePay's remaining confidential information stored on the Dropbox, it
refused to issue a preliminary injunction against the operation of Barnes'
56competing enterprise.
[18] PrimePay reinforces the lesson from Selectica that a laissez-faire
approach to personal clouds may lead to corporate disasters. Because
PrimePay did not monitor or disable the Dropbox account, Barnes
apparently left the company with a massive trove of proprietary company
data. Even though the court accepted Barnes' explanation that he accessed
little, if any, of that data after he left the company, PrimePay's evidence
suggested otherwise. While PrimePay may never know how much of its
information was used to start Barnes' competing enterprise, it is
reasonably certain that a more robust compliance program would have
quarantined the proprietary data before Barnes left the company.58 This
may have obviated the legal expenses and opportunity costs of the
litigation. Like Selectica, PrimePay ultimately teaches that organizations
PrimePay, L.L.C., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65710, at *11.
5 See id. at *64, 66.
56 See id. at *106-08.
5 See id. at *34-36, *100-01.
See Lee, supra note 5.
10
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should police approved BYOC environments to better safeguard
proprietary corporate information.
B. Stealth Use of Personal Clouds
[19] Beyond the problem of a poorly monitored BYOC ecosystem
stands the equally troubling scenario of stealth use of personal clouds.5 9
Such a scenario involves employees using their personal cloud accounts in
connection with their work duties without express company approval.6 0
While some employees do so in good faith to facilitate their work, others
clandestinely use their cloud accounts to sabotage the organization or to
gain a competitive advantage over their former employers after leaving the
company. 61 A number of decisions demonstrate the problems with
stealth-or "shadow"-use of personal clouds across the spectrum of
corporate employees.62
1. Operations-Level Employee
[20] Operations-level employees are often at the heart of stealth use of
personal clouds. For example, in Toyota Industrial Equipment
Manufacturing v. Land, a managerial level employee (Land) used Google
Drive and other personal cloud applications to steal hundreds of critical
5 See Danny Palmer, CIOs Worried Cloud Computing and Shadow IT Creating Security
Risks, COMPUTING (July 27, 2015), http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2419409/cios-
worried-cloud-computing-and-shadow-it-creating-security -risks, archived at
https://perma.cc/3 9AR-LJ4F.
60 See Thoran Rodrigues, Cloud Computing and the Dangers ofShadow IT,
TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 16, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-
enterprise-cloud/cloud-computing-and-the-dangers-of-shadow-it/, archived at
https://perma.cc/Y5BG-PEQZ.
61 See, e.g., Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, No. 4:12-CV-37; 4:15cv105, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 159915, at *3-4, *8-9 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2015); Toyota Indus. Equip.
Mfg. v. Land, No. 1:14-cv-1049-JMS-TAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99070, at *10, *13-
14 (S.D. Ind. July 21, 2014).
62 See Rodrigues, supra note 60.
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documents from his employer (Toyota) before going to work for an
industry competitor.6 3 Those documents included technical specifications
reflecting the proprietary design of certain industrial equipment, along
with related pricing and financial information.6 4 While authorized to use
that data during his employment, Land stored and kept shadow copies of
these materials on his Google Drive account so they could be accessible
65after he left Toyota.
[21] To facilitate the removal of Toyota's proprietary information, Land
66downloaded "GoogleDriveSync.exe" on his work computer. Similar to
the corporate-enabled Box account in Selectica, the GoogleDriveSync.exe
program enabled Land to simultaneously save documents on his personal
67Google Drive account that he saved to his company-issued computer. On
the eve of his departure from Toyota, Land placed approximately 800
"files and folders" on Google Drive.6 8 These actions-Land removing and
then retaining Toyota's proprietary information after his departure from
the company in violation of his non-disclosure agreement-resulted in an
injunction preventing Land from working for Toyota's competitor.6 9
[22] Another case involving stealth cloud use by an operations-level
employee is RLI Insurance Company v. Banks.70 In RLI, the employee
(Banks) used a Norwegian cloud provider (Jottacloud)71 to upload "757
63 See Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99070, at *3-7.
64 See id. at *5.
65 See id. at *5-7.
66 See id. at *6-8.
67 See id. at *6-7.
68 See Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99070, at *8.
69 See id. at *15-16, *22.
70 See RLI Ins. Co. v. Banks, No. 1:14-CV-1108-TWT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9396,
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2015).
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customer claim files and other files containing proprietary information"
belonging to her employer (RLI). 2 Banks initially tried to upload the files
to her Dropbox account, but RLI's corporate network denied access to
Dropbox. 73 RLI had employed a web filtering software blocking
employees from accessing more commonly used cloud providers, such as
Dropbox. 74 Undeterred, Banks researched "Dropbox alternatives" that
could evade RLI's filtering protocol, opened a Jottacloud account, and
used that service to remove proprietary RLI data in violation of her
employment agreement. 5 RLI eventually discovered Banks' malfeasance,
but only after offering her a severance package subsequent to her
'76dismissal from the company.
2. Company Executives
[23] Operations-level employees are not alone in their furtive use of
personal clouds. Company executives can also be guilty of such conduct.
Given the nature of access that executives often have to critical
information, such conduct can be particularly problematic. The Frisco
71 See id at *2; see generally JOTTACLOUD, https://www.jottacloud.com, archived at
https://perma.cc/7HQJ-AYFR (last visited Mar. 17, 2016) ("Jottacloud is a cloud storage
service for individuals and companies that lets you backup, synchronize, store and share
files from all your devices. The uploaded data is protected by one of the worlds [sic]
strongest privacy laws, with all your data stored in Norway.").
72 RLIIns. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9396, at *2.
73 See id.
71 See id. at *1-2.
75 Id. at *2.
76 See Verified Complaint for Damages and Emergency Injunctive Relief at 15-16, RLI
Ins. Co. v. Banks, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9396 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2015) (No. 1:14-CV-
1108-TWT) ("Not aware of Defendant's misappropriation of RLI's Customer Claim Files
and Proprietary Information, RLI offered Defendant a severance package upon her
termination. Defendant had not yet accepted the offer of a severance package when RLI
discovered the misappropriation. Based on Defendant's misconduct, RLI revoked its
offer of severance to Defendant by letter to Defendant.").
13
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Medical Center v. Bledsoe77 and De Simone v. VSL Pharmaceuticals78
cases are instructive in this particular scenario.
[24] In Frisco Medical, the chief operating officer (Bledsoe) for a
Texas hospital (Frisco) used Dropbox to obtain several classes of
proprietary and patient information before leaving Frisco for a new
position elsewhere.7 9 More specifically, Bledsoe installed Dropbox on her
work computer after she accepted her new position but before she
resigned from Frisco.80 With Dropbox enabled, Bledsoe then transferred
"Frisco's confidential and proprietary information, trade secrets, peer
review materials, and statutorily protected patient health information to
her personal" cloud account in violation of her employment agreements.81
[25] Frisco did not suspect that Bledsoe surreptitiously removed
proprietary information from its computer network until she revealed in an
exit interview that "she knew where too many bodies were buried." 8 2 It
was only then that Frisco began investigating Bledsoe's computer usage,
discovered her use of Dropbox, and determined the extent of the
information she had taken from the hospital.8 3
[26] In contrast to Frisco Medical, De Simone v. VSL Pharmaceuticals
involved a chief executive officer (De Simone) who used Dropbox to
7 See Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, No. 4:12-CV-37; 4:15cv105, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159915 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2015).
78 See De Simone v. VSL Pharm., Inc., No. TDC-15-1356, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128209, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2015).
7 9 See Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159915, at *8.
soSee id. at *12.
s 1 Id. at *11.
82 Id. at *7.
83 See id. at *7-9.
14
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deprive his company (VSL) of corporate records. 84 De Simone, who
served as VSL's chief executive for more than a decade, became
embroiled in a dispute with investors over who rightfully owned VSL's
intellectual property related to the probiotic drug sold by the company.
In connection with that dispute, De Simone transferred VSL's corporate
records to his personal Dropbox account. 8 6 He then wiped the corporate
network in order to eliminate any trace of the records and rejected
shareholder requests to access the information. 87 After resigning his
position as VSL's CEO a few months later, De Simone began working for
a competitive enterprise that manufactured and sold a generic version of
VSL's probiotic drug, taking the corporate records with him.88
3. Analysis of Cloud Jurisprudence
[27] The cases discussed so far generally involve harm to employers
that likely could have been obviated had the organizations taken
safeguards to prevent or detect stealth use of personal clouds. 89 Instead,
like Selectica, the employers in Toyota Industrial, RLI, and Frisco
Medical relied on non-disclosure and other employment agreements to
protect their sensitive and proprietary information."
84 See De Simone v. VSL Pharm., Inc., No. TDC-15-1356, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128209, at *48 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2015).
15 See id. at *1-2.
86 See id. at *48-49.
17 See id. at *18.
8 See id. at *2.
89 See discussion infra Part III.
90 See Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, No. 4:12-CV-37; 4:15cv105, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159915, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2015); RLI Ins. Co. v. Banks, No. 1:14-CV-
1108-TWT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9396, at *2, *6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2015); Toyota
Indus. Equip. Mfg. v. Land, No. 1:14-cv-1049-JMS-TAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99070,
at *4-6 (S.D. Ind. July 21, 2014).
15
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[28] On the one hand, those agreements successfully enabled the
aggrieved parties to obtain injunctions, summary judgment orders, and
damages against the cloud-wielding tortfeasors. 91 But at what cost? The
employers incurred legal fees and costs for the investigations and court
actions they undertook to address the theft of corporate information by
their former employees. In addition to those expenses, the organizations
sustained substantial opportunity costs. Personnel were likely redirected
from business operations to ameliorate the harm caused by the loss of
proprietary data. Moreover, industry competitors may have become
acquainted with strategic plans, pricing information, design specifications,
financial performance, and other proprietary data. All of this may have
provided their competitors with an advantage in subsequent business
dealings.9 2
[29] Simply put, the non-disclosure and employment agreements did
nothing to stop the perpetrating employees from misappropriating
company trade secrets. 9 3 Beyond the agreements, the only employer that
apparently took anything close to a preventative step was RLI, which used
a blocking program to prevent personal cloud use.9 4 However, even that
step proved inadequate as the employee easily circumvented the software
filter by using a previously unknown cloud application. 9 5
91 See Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159915, at *40-41 (granting
Frisco summary judgment against Bledsoe on its trade secret claims); Toyota Indus.
Equip. Mfg., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99070, at *21-22 (enjoining Land from
working for his new employer).
92 See Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159915, at *2 (stating that beyond
the problems with industry competitors, such unauthorized disclosures could violate
regulatory schemes such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, or
HIPAA).
93 See David S. Levine, School Boy's Tricks: Reasonable Cybersecurity and the Panic of
Law Creation, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323, 334-35 (2015) (observing that many
companies prefer to litigate rather than protect their trade secrets).
94 See RLI Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9396, at *1-2.
95 See id. at *2.
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[30] Just as in Prime Pay, none of the employers appears to have
established a process to detect the possible use of personal cloud
applications. This is evident from De Simone, as the company did not
know that its chief executive used Dropbox to steal its corporate records. 9 6
That no such process was in place in RLI is confirmed by the company's
initial offering of severance pay to Banks. 9 7 The Frisco employer only
began its search of Bledsoe's computer activity after she carelessly
suggested she knew where the "bodies were buried." 98 In Toyota
Industrial, no efforts were made either to examine Land's computer
activity or to verify his next work destination after he tendered his
resignation.99 Indeed, Toyota allowed Land to work for another two weeks
at the company before his termination date. 100
[31] With employees now regularly using consumer clouds in
connection with their work responsibilities, organizations must be
prepared to counteract their potential negative effects. As set forth in Part
III, companies should develop proactive measures to address employee
use of cloud applications and to mitigate any resulting harm.
III. PROACTIVE STEPS TO ADDRESS PERSONAL CLOUD USE
[32] Despite the complexities that personal clouds now present for
many organizations, they are not insurmountable. Enterprises can
generally manage potential problems through a proactive, common sense
96 See De Simone v. VSL Pharm., Inc., No. TDC-15-1356, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128209, at *48 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2015).
97 See Verified Complaint for Damages and Emergency Injunctive Relief at 15-16, RLI
Ins. Co. v. Banks, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9396 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2015) (No. 1:14-CV-
1108-TWT).
98 Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, No. 4:12-CV-37; 4:15cv105, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159915, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2015).
99 See Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg. v. Land, No. 1:14-cv-1049-JMS-TAB, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99070, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 21, 2014).
100 See id.
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approach to information governance. In this Part, I discuss some of the key
aspects of an information governance program that can help address the
challenges associated with employee use of personal cloud applications.
[33] A prefatory step that organizations can take in this regard is to
create a data map identifying the locations-both on and off the corporate
network-where their information resides. 101 While a data map is useful
for both information retention and litigation purposes, it is essential for
controlling ingress and egress to proprietary information-precisely the
data endangered by personal cloud applications. 1 0 2 If a company cannot
identify the precise areas where it has stored its trade secrets and other
sensitive materials, it becomes difficult to establish that it used
"reasonable steps" to safeguard that information. 1 0 3 In contrast, a current
and accurate data map better enables organizations to reasonably account
for proprietary records, along with other indispensable business
101 See David Wetmore & Scott Clary, To Map or Not to Map: Strategies for Classifying
Sources ofESI, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (2009),
http://content.arma.org/IMM/SeptOct2009/to-mapornotto_map.aspx, archived at
https://perma.cc/CG8S-VACB.
102 See R. Mark Halligan, Protecting U.S. Trade Secret Assets in the 21st Century, 6
LANDSLIDE, No. 1, Sept.-Oct. 2013, at 4,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/landslide/2013-14/september-october-
2013/protectingus tradesecret assets the_21st century.html, archived at
https://perma.cc/FU3T-L4FW (urging companies to adopt "mapping" approaches to
better safeguard trade secrets); see also Sterling Miller, Ten Things: Trade Secrets and
Protecting Your Company, CORPORATE LAW ADVISORY (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive
/2015/04/27/ten-things-trade-secrets-and-protecting-your-company.aspx, archived at
https://perma.cc/XH3L-WXRQ [hereinafter Miller] ("You need an inventory of all of the
company's trade secrets . . . [a]n inventory helps you identify what steps are needed to
keep those specific items confidential and protected and be clear with the business what
items are not considered trade secrets . . .").
103 See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Lee, No. 13-13156-DJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66220,
at *10, *12-13 (D. Mass. May 14, 2014) (finding the employer used "reasonable means
to protect its trade secrets" despite contradictory evidence suggesting an employee openly
used a personal Google Drive account to access and store confidential company
information).
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- - 104--information. Once the data map is in place, organizations can then
proceed to develop policies that reasonably ensure the protection of
corporate data.10 5
[34] Those policies should include actionable protocols that address
employee use of personal cloud applications. 106 Those protocols should
clearly delineate whether personal clouds are permitted and if so, what
constitutes an authorized BYOC account. 107 Whether an enterprise
chooses to ban the use of personal clouds or to adopt a BYOC-friendly
environment, the policy should include audit and enforcement
mechanisms to gauge policy observance. l0s At a minimum, those
mechanisms ought to include the right to monitor, access, and disable
employee use of personal clouds. 109 Related mechanisms will also be
required for those organizations that proscribe BYOC use since employees
104 See Halligan, supra note 102, at 4.
1os See, e.g., Philip J. Favro, Getting Serious: Why Companies Must Adopt Information
Governance Measures to Prepare for the Upcoming Changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, 25-35 (2014),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i2/article5.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/SZ3M-3MNP
(explaining that a comprehensive information governance plan would take various factors
into consideration. They would likely include the length of pertinent retention periods,
the ability to preserve data for legal matters, applicable data protection laws,
cybersecurity initiatives, and use policies for smartphones and other mobile devices).
106 See Philip Favro, Do You Know Your BYOCs?, LEGAL TECH. NEWS (July 13, 2015),
http://www.legaltechnews.com/id= 1202731897715?keywords=favro&publication=Legal
+Technology, archived at https://perma.cc/QF6S-8KVW.
107 See Miller, supra note 102.
1os See Sophie Vanhegan, Legal Guidance: Protecting Company Information in the
Cloud-Era, HRZONE (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.hrzone.com/performi/business/legal-
guidance-protecting-company-information-in-the-cloud-era, archived at
https://perma.cc/8MGT-3QZG.
109 See id. (observing that corporate policies must "allow company monitoring of
employees' IT activity and work email accounts. .
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will likely circumvent such a policy.1 10 For example, blocking programs
like the one used in RLI, while not foolproof, are a practicable first step to
preventing some personal cloud use."'
[35] In a BYOC ecosystem, applicable protocols should additionally
describe what company data can or cannot be transferred to the cloud. 1 12
Organizations should also require the disclosure of user login credentials
for approved cloud applications to ensure appropriate policy
compliance. 113 Upon an employee's termination, approved BYOC
accounts should either be disabled or the company should verify that
company data previously maintained in the account has been either
returned or destroyed. 114
[36] In like manner, non-BYOC organizations should consider
examining terminated employees' computer activity and corporate devices
to detect whether there was illicit use of personal clouds.1 15 However, such
a step may not be practicable for many organizations that lack the
110 See id. ("Employers may also wish to consider ... implementing IT measures to
prohibit uploading of documents onto web-based applications."); see also RLI Ins. Co. v.
Banks, No. 1:14-CV-1108-TWT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9396, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27,
2015).
111 See, e.g., RLI Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9396, at *1-2.
112 See Vanhegan, supra note 108 (explaining that policies addressing personal cloud
usage should "expressly prohibit the removal of company documents and information
outside the company's systems.").
113 See Esther Schindler, Protecting Corporate Data... When an Employee Leaves,
DRUVA BLOG (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.druva.com/blog/protecting-corporate-data-
employee-leaves/, archived at https://perma.cc/4GS5-QJ9H.
114 See Rachel Holdgrafer, Fix Insider Threat with Data Loss Prevention, CLOUD
SECURITY ALLIANCE (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://blog.cloudsecurityalliance.org/2015/12/10/fix-insider-threat-with-data-loss-
prevention/, archived at https://perma.cc/EU5U-2FZN.
115 See Miller, supra note 102 ("Departing employees constitute one of your biggest risks
for trade-secret theft.").
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resources for a thorough review of every employee device. If a
comprehensive sweep is cost prohibitive, organizations should consider
conducting a review of those employees whose possible disclosure of
corporate information carries the greatest risk to the enterprise. 116 The
extent to which a company carries out this step likely depends on the role
of the terminated employees, their position in the company, and the nature
of the information to which they were privy.1 17 Despite the expense of this
procedure, such a step would likely have obviated much of the litigation
that ensued in Selectica, Novatus, Toyota Industrial, RLI, and Frisco
Medical.
IV. CONCLUSION
[37] The challenges with personal cloud applications need not be an
intractable problem. Following industry best practices like those suggested
in Part III should help organizations address many of the troubles
associated with approved BYOC accounts. They should also mitigate the
harm created by stealth cloud use that may go undetected. While certainly
not an elixir, adopting these practices should help companies avoid many
of the worst problems associated with personal cloud use in the enterprise.
116 See id.
117 See id.; see also Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, No. 4:12-CV-37; 4:15cv105,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159915, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2015).
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